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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below,
Plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a trust, filed this action seeking to void certain transfers

made by the Trustee of the trust, Bruce Hughes, to companies in which Bruce Hughes
and the now deceased Trustor held pecuniary interests. Plaintiffs asserted that because
the Trustee had an interest in those business entities that the transactions should be
voided.
On June 30, 2006, Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. 264. Plaintiffs opposed the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and filed
their own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 283.) However, Plaintiffs did not
dispute the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts that dealt specifically with
calculation of the debt owed by the decedent's estate to the various business entities. Id.
Nonetheless, upon hearing on December 12, 2006, the Court issued its Order on Motions
for Summary Judgment, wherein it denied Defendants' Second Motion for Judgment and
granted, in part, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment indicating that the Trustee had
breached fiduciary duty by making payment to the related business entities and ordering
that the funds be disgorged to the trust. (R. 344.) Eventually, those funds were disgorged
and held in trust by Plaintiffs' counsel, pursuant to court order.
Shortly after issuance of the Court's Order on Summary Judgment, Defendants
filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings of Fact and/or Judgment. (R. 353.) At that
time, Defendants believed that the Court entered an erroneous Finding of Fact. (R. 354.)
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Specifically, the Court found that the business entities had not conducted specific
valuations under certain buy-sell agreement that required appraisals by an independent
certified public accountant. (R. 348.) The Court's other Findings of Fact specifically
quoted the buy-sell agreement wherein the valuation of an independent certified public
accountant was required if the shareholders or members of the entities had not
unanimously agreed to an adjustment of the buy-sell agreement price for two consecutive
fiscal years. (R. 347.) It was clear that the deceased Trustor of the trust died within two
years of the agreement and, therefore, valuation of the price at that time did not require an
independent certified public accountant. (R. 356-357.)
The Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Findings went to hearing on February
20, 2007. Although the Court appears to recognize this error in Findings of Fact, the
Court continues to struggle with issuing a ruling until a proper calculation may be made.
Therefore, the Court's ruling on that date recognized that Defendants had already set
forth evidence of what the proper calculation of the debt was to the business entities. The
Court specifically states, "We decided that the next step is to find out what is the price."
(R. 642 lines 9-10, A copy of the Courts Transcript is provided for convenience in the
Addendum to this Brief.) The Court continued stating, "It may be moot if you're right
and an expert suggested by the Plaintiffs comes in and looks at what your clients did and
said, yeah, that's the way you value it, they were right, then we're done." (R. 643 lines 711.) The parties went on to discuss with the Court an extension of discovery deadlines to
allow Plaintiffs time to provide an expert to refute Defendants' presented evidence of the
proper calculation. The Court stated, "The discovery deadlines have to be extended so
2

you can get out and get some expert testimony on this." (R. 644 lines 5-7.) The Court
further addressed to Defendants that, "You may want to get your own independent expert
who's going to say exactly what your people said." (R. Id. lines 9-11.) The Court notes
that, "Mr. Kuhlmann might find that he can't find one [an expert], in which case this case
is over with." (R. Id. lines 13-15.) Thereafter, the parties entered into a Stipulated
Scheduling Order, which was entered on April 26, 2007, wherein each of the parties had
a date certain to identify a designated expert and provide a report. (R. 391.) Pursuant to
the Order, Plaintiffs were required to first identify an expert then Defendants could
identify an expert. Id. Thereafter, the Order required that Plaintiffs first provide an expert
report then Defendants provide an expert report. Id.
Plaintiffs identified an expert but failed to provide any expert report. Defendants
thqn filed their third Motion for Summary Judgment when Plaintiffs failed to provide any
expert report. (R. 431.) Defendants again asserted, as a basis for summary judgment, that
they had produced undisputed fact as to the proper calculation and that the Plaintiffs had
failed to come forward with any evidence, expert or otherwise, to refute that calculation,
and could not, refute said calculation at trial. (R. 436.) The trial court heard argument on
the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment on January 8, 2008, and entered its
memorandum decision on Motions for Summary Judgment on February 4, 2008. (R.
593.) The Court recognized that the Plaintiffs had failed to procure an expert or do any
review of the Defendants' otherwise undisputed calculation of the debt owed to the
business entities. (R. 594.) Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to that
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calculation, the Court ruled in Defendants' favor and ordered a return of the previously
disgorged funds. (R. 595.)
II. Statement of Relevant Facts.
The best statement of relevant facts from which to understand this case comes
from the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in its second Motion for Summary
Judgment. It is important to note that Plaintiffs, in its Memorandum in Opposition,
disputed none of these facts, except Paragraph number 6 for the legal status of Academy
Equity Investors, LLC, in that the company had expired for failure to renew in 2005. (R.
283.) Otherwise, all of the foregoing facts, including the calculation of the debt owed by
the decedent Trustor to the business entities, were undisputed.
1. Plaintiffs are the adult children of decedent Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and
beneficiaries of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust dated December 5, 2000. (R.
279.)
2. Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr died on October 18, 2001. (R. 279.)
3. Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth
Farr Living Trust and acted as such upon the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair. (R. 279.)
4. Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. is a Utah Corporation doing
business in Iron County, Utah. (R. 279.)
5. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the shareholders of The Academy
At Cedar Mountain owning an equal number shares, were Sheryl Marie Blulh Farr, Bruce
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle. (R. 279.)
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6. Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability
Company. (R. 279.)
7. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the members of Academy Equity
Investors, LLC, holding equal interests, were Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr. Bruce Hughes,
Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle. (R. 279.)
8. Academy Acres, LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability Company. (R. 279.)
9. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the members of Academy Acres,
LLC, holding equal interests, were Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas
Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle. (R. 279.)
10. The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. operated a private school in Cedar
City, Utah. (R. 279.)
11. Academy Acres, LLC, owned the real estate holdings upon which the The
Academy At Cedar Mountain school operated. (R. 279.)
12. Academy Equity Investors, LLC, was initially organized to receive financial
contributions to finance the operation of the school as a whole. (R. 279.)
13. From the inception, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were
directors of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. (R. 279.)
14. On January 4, 2000, the directors of The Academy At Cedar Mountain
adopted the official Bylaws of The Academy At Cedar Mountain. (R. 279.)
15. The Bylaws of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., by reference, at
Exhibit A, a stockholder buy-sell agreement containing the following provisions (R.
279):
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1.3 Transfers At Death. On the death of any stockholder, the stockholder's
personal representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to the Academy all
the deceased stockholder's shares in the company at the agreement price and on
the agreement terms, as indicated in this section.
1.7 Ownership In Academy Acres, LLC. The shareholders contemplate the
formation of a real estate limited liability company to be named Academy Acres,
LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real property for the
use and lease by the Academy. Any transfer deed to have incurred under this
section shall automatically trigger a buyout of the stockholder's ownership in
Academy Acres, LLC, and effectively cause the stockholder's expulsion from the
LLC.
2.1 Annual Revisions. Each year the stockholders shall meet and shall
review the agreement price. If the stockholder's unanimously so agree, they shall
modify the agreement price to reflect that they believe to be the then current fair
market value of the company. The agreement price shall be determined by taking
the current agreed fair market value of the company minus all mortgages, debts,
stockholder loans and accrued payables of the company. It is possible, from time
to time, that the agreement price will be a negative value, which will represent an
obligation of the transferring stockholder of their estate to the company.
2.2 Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after
the date of this agreement, if the stockholders have not unanimously agreed to an
adjustment in the agreement price for two consecutive fiscal years, pursuant to
section 2.1, the agreement price, as most recently adjusted, shall be valued by
appraisal pursuant to section 2.3.
2.3 How Computed. The agreement price will be the fair market value of
the offered shares as determined by the independent certified public accountant
("CPA") regularly employed by the Academy or, if the Academy has no regularly
employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by the Academy for
this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same methods as would
be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered shares if the offering
stockholder had died on the date the offered was deemed made, ignoring any
alternate valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation (under Code
§2032A).
3.2 Negative Value Payment Due To The Academy. If the agreed value
calculated or agreed to in section 2 above is a negative value, the determining
stockholder and estate shall have an obligation payable to the company.
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3.2.1 Due To Death Of Stockholder. The negative values of the shares of
the deceased stockholders shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the
life insurance policies that any stockholder has maintained under section 4, be paid
in cash by good or personal check. Any remaining amount of the negative value
shall be a claim against the available assets of the stockholder's estate.
16. The initial members of Academy Acres, LLC, entered in the Operating
Agreement of Academy Acres, LLC, effective August 1, 2000. (R. 280.)
17. The Operating Agreement of Academy Acres, LLC, contained an Exhibit A,
containing a Member's Buy-Sell Agreement incorporated into the Operating Agreement
by reference. (R. 280.)
18. A Member's Buy-Sell Agreement contained the following provisions (R. 280281):
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any member, the member's
personal representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to the Academy all
of the deceased's member's interests in the company at the agreement price and on
the agreement terms as indicated in this section.
2.3 How Computed. The agreement price will be the fair market value of
the offered interest as determined by the independent certified public accountant
("CPA") regularly employed by the Academy or, if the Academy has no regularly
employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by the Academy for
this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same methods as would
be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered interests if the offering
member had died on the date the offered was deemed made, ignoring any alternate
valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation (under Code §2032A).
3.2 Negative Value Payment Due To The Academy. If the agreed value
calculated or agreed to in section 2 above, is negative value, the determining
member or their estate will have an obligation payable to the company.
3.2.1 Due To Death Of A Member. The negative values of the interests of
the deceased member shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the life
insurance policies that any member has maintained under section 4, be paid in
cash or good personal check. Any remaining amount of the negative value shall
be a claim against the available assets of the member's estate.
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19. Thomas Hughes regularly provided and maintained the accounting books and
records of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 281.)
20. Upon the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair, Thomas Hughes calculated Ms.
Farr's share of the negative value of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and
Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 281.)
21. Article VI of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Trust provided as follows (R. 281):
6.1 Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following:
6.1.2 Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my estate.
22. As Trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust, Bruce Hughes paid
$6,000.00 directly to The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., as a partial payment of
decedent's negative value in that entity. (R. 281.)
23. As Trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust, Bruce Hughes paid
$115,000.00 to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, as and for partial payment upon the
negative value of the decedent's interest in The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and
Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 282.)
24. Thomas Hughes is an accountant and regularly performed and maintained the
accounting books and records of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., Academy
Acres, LLC, and Academy Equity Investors, LLC. (R. 254.)
25. After the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr, Thomas Hughes prepared an
accounting of the assets and liabilities of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and
Academy Acres, LLC, based upon the books and records of those entities. (R. 254.)

8

26. The accounting provided in Exhibit A was made as a valuation determined
under the same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the
offered shares if the offering stockholder had died on the date the offer was deemed
made, ignoring any alternate valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation
(under Code §2032A). (R. 254.)
27. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, the liabilities of The Academy At
Cedar Mountain exceeded its assets by the sum of $572,716.70. The Estate of Sheryl
Marie Bluth Fair's share of said debt, less the $1,000.00 capital contribution already
made by Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair, was $113,543.34. (R. 254-255.)
28. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, the liabilities of Academy Acres,
LLC, exceeded its assets by the sum of $177,861.62. The Estate of Sheryl Marie Bluth
Fair's one-fifth share of said excess liability over assets is $35,572.32. (R. 255.)
29. Based upon Thomas Hughes' accounting, the total negative values of both
The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC, due and owing by the
Estate of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair was $149,115.66. (R. 255.)
30. The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., was paid $6,000.00 towards said debt.
(R. 255.)
31. A check in the amount of $ 115,000.00 was paid to Academy Equity Investors,
LLC, in partial satisfaction of the negative values owed to The Academy At Cedar
Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 255.)
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32. After application of the two foregoing payments, the Estate of Sheryl Marie
Bluth Farr still owes, as and for her share of negative value, the sum of $28,115.66. (R.
255.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case centered around Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2), prior to its July 1,
2004, revision, which provided as follows:
Any sale or encumbrance to the trustee, the trustee's spouse, agent,
attorney, or any corporation or trust in which the trustee has a
substantial beneficiary interest or any transaction, which is affected
by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the trustee, is
voidable by any interested person, except one who has consented
after fair disclosure unless:
(a) the trust expressly authorized the transaction; or
(b) the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested
persons.
It has always been conceded in this case that Bruce Hughes was the trustee of the
Sheryl Farr Trust while at the same time was a member or shareholder of certain business
entities to which the decent Trustor, Sheryl Farr, was his business partner. Before Sheryl
Fair's death, the parties entered into buy-sell agreements concerning the various business
entities which included provisions as to the consequences of death of a shareholder or
member and the obligations of the parties. It was the clear intent of the buy-sell
agreements that upon death the shareholder's or member's interest was deemed offered
for sale at an agreed upon price. The "agreed upon price" was an attempt to value the
business and, if the business had a positive value, the estate would be entitled to a share
of that positive value. Likewise, if it was determined that the business entities had a
negative value it was clear that the deceased shareholder's or member's estate had an
10

obligation to pay an equal share of that negative value. Unfortunately, at the time of
Sheryl Fair's death, the business entities were new, and due to significant debt had
negative values.
Subsequent to the death of Sheryl Farr the remaining business partners got
together and calculated the negative value of the business entities consistent with the
mandates of the buy-sell agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the buy-sell agreements, the
members or shareholders were required to come to an agreed upon price, but were not
required to utilize the services of an independent certified public accountant. An agreed
upon price was created as calculated by one of the business partners, Tom Fuller, and
presented to the Court by Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment. That calculation
was, and always been, undisputed fact. Plaintiffs never produced any evidence that
would suggest a contrary calculation.
The mandates of Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2) are clear that transactions
affected by conflicts of interest are 'Voidable", and not "void." In other words, the
Court, when faced with a conflict of interest, has discretion to determine the propriety of
the transaction and determine whether it should be set aside or not. The court made clear
in its decision upon Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment that, "The buysell agreements remained for litigation." (R. 351.) The Court clarified in its hearing on
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment that it was essentially looking for
clarification as to the proper calculation of the debt. The Court made clear that if
Defendants' calculation was not refuted, and appeared appropriate, that there was no
reason to void the transaction. Plaintiffs' failure to provide any evidence of an incorrect
11

calculation resulted in a finding of no genuine issue of material fact as to that calculation.
The Court determined that if the calculation was correct, and the estate of Sheryl Fanowed money to the business entities, that it was proper for her trust to pay that debt of the
estate. Absent a showing of some impropriety, the conflict of interest alone was not
sufficient enough to void the transaction.
It is Defendants' position that, given Plaintiffs failure to come forward with any
evidence of an improper calculation and failure to produce an expert to even attempt to
review or dispute the calculation, it was clear that Plaintiffs could not prevail at trial with
a sufficient burden of proof in showing the Court that it should void this transaction.
Consequently, the Court's final ruling on summary judgment was proper.
ARGUMENT
I.

Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment was Proper.

Plaintiffs argue, in essence, upon appeal, that the grant of summary judgment in
Defendants' favor was improper because (a) Plaintiffs had already won the case on
summary judgment, (b) that they were not required to have the assistance of an expert
witness, and (c) that they were inappropriately sanctioned. Each of the Plaintiffs'
arguments on appeal is misplaced because Plaintiffs fail to recognize the difference
between a transaction that is "void" and a transaction that is "voidable." The relied upon
statute, Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2) clearly provided that a transaction was
"voidable" not "void" if affected by a substantial conflict of interest. Plaintiffs' entire
appeal is premised on the fact that a Court made a finding of a conflict of interest and,
Plaintiff would argue, that Plaintiff won the case based upon that finding aloae. Plaintiffs
12

fail to recognize that if there were a determination that the debt was proper, and properly
calculated, that the Court had discretion to not void the transaction despite the conflict the
interest.
A. The Plaintiffs' Prior Grant of Summary Judgment was
Partial Only to the Issue of Conflict of Interest.
The Plaintiffs assert, in their appeal, that because the Court ordered on December
12, 2006, that there was a breach of the buy-sell agreement and that the trustee had
breached its fiduciary duties, and that the trustee was ordered to disgorge funds back to
the trust, that that was the "law of the case" and the case was essentially over. It is quite
curious that the Defendants would voluntarily enter into a Stipulation to extend deadlines
concerning expert reports, if they truly believed the case was over. More importantly,
Plaintiffs' assertions completely ignore the Court's December 12, 2006, ruling wherein it
states, as a Conclusion of Law number three that, "It remains for the parties to either
litigate their obligations under the buy-sell agreements, or to settle or to mediate." (R.
351.) That language was clarified in the hearing upon Defendants' Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment wherein Defendants' counsel inquired the following:
Where I'm a little curious in the Court's Order it says the buy-sell
agreements must be followed and remain for litigation, and I'm a
little unclear as to what the Court was intending there. Are we not,
then, going back and saying, okay, we need to find out whether the
calculation was the right calculation?
The Court: That's the way I saw it, counsel.
Mr. Olson: Okay. And so I guess under that theory, if we continued
in the litigation under the Court's Order as set, we come into the
Court, we put on evidence of whether that figure was the right
13

figure. If it was the right figure, there is no money to be paid back.
And if it was the wrong figure, then there is money to be paid back.
The Court: And the issue is what to do with the money in the
meantime, and the Court's Order says to pay it back into the trust
and to hold it in the trust until that litigation is done, we figure out
what that price is.
Mr. Olson: Right.
The Court: That's the way I see this litigation coming out. I don't
see this case as having been dissolved — or resolved by my summary
judgment.
Mr. Olson: And, of course —
The Court: In fact, I have to say since she's here in the courtroom,
my clerk and I both came to that conclusion at the time we were
going over this Order specifically, we decided that the next step is to
find out what is the price.
(R. 641-642. See Addendum)
It is impossible for Plaintiffs to come forward now and state that because the Court
found that there was a conflict of interest or that the buy-sell agreement was not followed
that the case was over as the Court clearly indicates that a price must be determined and
Plaintiffs may be entitled to nothing.
Plaintiffs go on to assert that because of the Court's orders and the law of the case,
that "expert testimony" was unnecessary and the failure to provide expert reports had no
effect upon the Court or the claims of Defendants. The fundamental flaw of the
Plaintiffs' argument is that the Court made it abundantly clear that the only issue
remaining for trial was the calculation of that debt. The only calculation of Ihe debt
before the Court was that as asserted by the Defendants, and undisputed by Plaintiffs.
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The Court attempted to provide Plaintiffs with opportunity to dispute that debt by having
an expert review it. Again, that was abundantly clear in the Court's hearing upon
Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend wherein the Court stated, "It may be moot if
you're right and an expert suggested by the Plaintiffs comes in and looks at what your
clients [Defendants] did and said, yeah, that's the way you value it and they were right,
then we're done." (R. 643.) The Court further ordered that, "The discovery deadlines
have to be extended so you can get out and get some expert testimony on this." (R. 644.)
The Court suggested, as an option, that the Defendant "may want to get your own
independent expert who's going to say exactly what your people said." (R. 644.) The
Court recognized that "Mr. Kuhlmann might find that he can't find one [expert] in which
case this case is over with." (R. 644.)
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs cannot possibly argue that no expert was
necessary as they had no other means to dispute the calculation provided by Defendants
at trial.
B. Plaintiffs' Need for an Expert Report was not "Rebuttal" in
Nature but Rather, Necessary to Carry its Burden of Proof
at Trial.

Plaintiffs next assert that the only reason they would have used an expert would be
to rebut any expert provided by Defendants. Plaintiffs, curiously, go on to argue that they
had already received a favorable ruling requiring restitution of the funds, and they had,
essentially, already won the case. This assertion is curious given the Trial Court's
repeated explanation that the sole remaining issue at trial was calculation of this debt, that
15

the only calculation before the Court was that of Defendants and that Plaintiff would be
required to provide, presumably through experts, some evidence of the inaccuracy of this
calculation. The Trial Court made it very clear to Plaintiffs that if they could not find an
expert or if their expert came forward and agreed with the calculation then the Court
would determine that the amounts were properly paid and the money should be returned.
It is also curious that Plaintiffs would argue their expert report was required only
for rebuttal purposes when the Stipulation, and the Order actually entered, required that
they first provide an expert report no later than June 15, 2007. Defendants were not
required to provide an expert report until after the Plaintiffs on July 13, 2007. The Order
provided absolutely no provision allowing for any additional expert report by the
Plaintiffs to rebut that of the Defendants. This is a Stipulated Scheduling Order that
Plaintiffs' counsel drafted. Given the specific requirement of the Plaintiffs to first
designate and first provide an expert report, and the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel drafted
this document, Plaintiffs cannot possibly argue that they had no obligation to produce
until after the Defendants had done so.
Based upon the foregoing, it is simply impossible for the Plaintiffs to argue that
they needed to provide expert testimony only in the nature of rebuttal. Rather, given the
only issue remaining for trial was whether Defendants had accurately calculated the debt,
Plaintiffs should be required to answer the question; "What evidence did Plaintiffs have
that the calculations were incorrect?" The obvious answer to that question, absent an
expert review and report, is "nothing." Furthermore, Plaintiffs appellate argument that
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they were substantially justified in failing to comply with the Scheduling Order, based
upon this "rebuttal" theory is also misplaced.
C. The Trial Court's Sanctions were Proper.

Plaintiff asserts that the Trial Court sanctioned them for failing to comply with
Rule 16(d) and 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to comply with the
Scheduling Order. It is important to note, in the Court's memorandum decision, that it
recognized the Plaintiffs had "failed even now to produce evidence that the calculations
are in fact incorrect..." Although the Court does analyze the effects of Rule 16 and 37,
on the failure to follow scheduling orders, it is clear that the Court recognizes that there
exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the calculation of the debt, the only
remaining issue for trial. Consequently, regardless of any sanction, summary judgment
was proper to the Defendants as a matter of law.
The trial court has broad discretion to select the appropriate sanction to apply
under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hales v. Oldrovd. 999 P.2d 588 (Utah
App. 2000). Plaintiffs suggest that the Hall v. NACM Intermountain Inc., 988 P.2d 942
(Utah 1999) imposes upon the Court some requirement with regard to sanctions under
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' assertion is incorrect. The Hall
decision dealt with sanctions imposed against an attorney for failure to notify fellow
counsel of a scheduling continuance. The Hall decision deals specifically with sanctions
pursuant to Rule 16. In fact, the Hall decision does not even cite Rule 37 and has no
bearing with regard to a court's ruling under Rule 37. Consequently, Plaintiffs' argument

17

that some more detailed memorandum, other than the Court's Order as entered, is
required to impose sanctions under Rule 37 is simply misplaced.
D. Plaintiffs are Not Relieved of Their Obligation to Provide an
Expert Report Merely Because Defendants Failed To.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant did not provide a timely expert report pursuant to
the Court's Scheduling Order. That is true. However, what Plaintiffs fail to recognize
that Defendants have already put forth undisputed facts with regard to the calculation of
the debt in question. Defendant had absolutely no obligation to present this evidence
through an expert. Rather, the Court merely suggested, that if Plaintiffs were going to
hire an expert that Defendants may desire to do so. The fallacy of Plaintiffs' argument is
that Plaintiffs, who have the burden of proof, had absolutely no evidence, expert or
otherwise, to suggest that the calculation was inaccurate. When Plaintiffs failed to take
the opportunity provided to them, by the Court, to hire an expert to review the
calculation, then Plaintiffs simply had no way to rebut the calculation as provided by the
Defendants and could not succeed on that issue at trial. Although Plaintiffs couch this
argument by suggesting Plaintiffs were punished and Defendants were not, the reality is
that Plaintiffs cannot prove their case at trial and Defendants had no need fDY an expert.
Therefore, the suggestion that only one party was sanctioned in this case is simply
misplaced.
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II.

CONCLUSION

On February 20, 2007, the Trial Court made it abundantly clear that the only issue
left for trial was to determine the appropriate calculation of the debt owed by the estate of
Sheryl Fair to the various business entities to find out if the payment to those entities is
appropriate. The Trial Court understood that Defendants had already presented a
calculation as to their position on the debt. The Trial Court made it abundantly clear to
Plaintiffs that they would need to provide some evidence that the calculation was
incorrect to avoid payment of that debt. Plaintiffs simply failed to procure the
appropriate expert, or any expert report, or even have any expert conduct a review, to
meet that burden of proof. Plaintiffs seem to assert that a conflict of interest, regardless
of the validity of the debt, entitles to them to a windfall and avoidance of their mother's
contracted debts. The very nature of a "voidable" transaction requires a court's discretion
to determine propriety given the conflict of interest. The Trial Court's grant of summary
judgment is entirely appropriate and should not be overruled.
DATED this ^

day of October, 2008.

j^s?

ZS£

Brian L. Olson
of and for
GALLIAN, WILCOX,
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C.

Attorney for Defendants
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4
5

THE BAILIFF:
continue in session.
THE COURT:

All rise.

The Court will

Please be seated.
Thank you, everyone, we're

6

back on the record for the 20th of February and it is

7

Farr versus Hughes, 030500098.

8
9

Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of the
defendants.

Even though all your pleadings on this

10

thing say you 1 re attorneys for plaintiff, I know

11

you're attorneys for defendant.

12

to revisit the findings of fact in the Court's

13

memorandum decision in this case because as I see it

14

it's your position that the buy-sell agreements

15

provided that there would be a two year continuous

16

period of failure of the parties to agree on a value

17

before there would be a submission to an independent

18

CPA for valuation, and that the agreements were

19

executed in August of 2001 and Mrs. Farr died in

20

October of 2001.

21

of time could not have passed, just as a matter of

22

fact, this agreement had only been in place for 60

23

plus days at the time of her death.

You want the Court

And, therefore, a two year period

24

Have I got that right, Counsel?

25

MR. OLSON:

Pretty close, Counsel.

**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
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1

Actually the agreements, if I remember correctly,

2

were signed in the fall of 2000.

3

a year from the time they were signed until the time

4

of Sheryl Farr's death, but still less than the

5

two-year period.

6

So there was about

I think I've got that right.

But essentially the Court's ruling was

7

that, hey, we can't call this a legally enforceable

8

claim against the estate because the buy-sell

9

agreements were not complied with.

In fact, Looking

10

at the Court's order on page 7 it says, The buy-sell

11

agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim

12

against the deceased member or shareholder's estate

13

until certain conditions are fulfilled, one of those

14

conditions being that it be valued by an independent

15

certified public accountant.

16

THE COURT:

But the prequel to that

17

condition was that there would be two years go by

18

without any agreement as to valuation of the asset.

19

MR. OLSON:

That's exactly right, Your

20

Honor.

So I think that that portion of the

21

agreements were overlooked.

22

notes in its findings of fact that the agreements for

23

the two different entities are virtually identical

24

with regard to how we calculate the agreement price.

25

The agreement price isn't calculated just

And the Court correctly

**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
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1

pursuant to that paragraph 2.3 that's quoted.

2

Rather, the entire Section 2 goes to how do we

3

calculate the agreement price, and it talks about the

4

annual revisions and it talks about the parties to

5

the agreement, or the members of these entities,

6

coming to an agreement as to value, only if they do

7

not do that for two consecutive fiscal years do we

8

get to the point of needing an independent certified

9

public accountant.

10

THE COURT:

But as I understand the facts

11

in this case, no action was taken to reach any

12

valuation whatsoever for two successive years at the

13

time that the payments were made from the trust into

14

the entities.

15

MR. OLSON:

But actually that's not

16

correct.

17

Thomas Hughes and Thomas Fuller sat down and made

18

such an accounting, the accounting that was put

19

before the Court in the affidavit -- I believe it's

20

on Ms. Hughes, I get the two confused, or Thomas

21

Fuller.

22

members got together and said, Yeah, that's the value

23

of the entity.

24
25

At the time of the death of Sheryl Farr,

There was an accounting made and all the

THE COURT:

Except, Counsel, how do we get

around this self dealing that seems to be implicit of
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1

your interpretation of the documents?

2

is a beneficiary of this particular process is an

3

insider and the Farr trust is locked out in that

4

process, and that's why Mr. Kuhlmann's clients are in

5

court.

6
7
8
9

MR. OLSON:

Sure.

Everybody who

And I understand the

Court's concern.
The other problem that we have on the
other end of this equation is how do we put parties

10

to an agreement that they didn't make?

11

look at the buy-sell agreement and we have to abide

12

by what the parties agreed to do.

13

We ha^e to

Now, by that same token, I think the way

14

that we solve this problem, obviously in the

15

litigation is, plaintiffs hire their expert, he goes

16

in and looks at the accounting and says You've done

17

correctly or no, it wasn't done correctly.

18

never do that.

19

discovery deadlines have long since passed, they've

20

never gone in and audited the books to see if this

21

calculation was correct or it wasn't correct.

22

Rather, when we filed for summary judgment and we

23

stated that the undisputed facts are here's the

24

accounting, they didn't deny it.

25

established fact for purposes of summary judgment

But they

Now, this case is four years old,

So it was an
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1

that this was the calculation of the debt.

2

THE COURT:

When it comes to established

3

facts for summary judgment, what about Mr. Kuhlmann's

4

argument that there was no compliance with Rule 11

5

and we have a recent Utah Court of Appeals case that

6

really does enforce rules -- ITm sorry, Rule 7, not

7

Rule 11.

8

in the memorandum going back and forth, Mr. Kuhlmann

9

makes the argument that there is and there is now

10
11
12
13

Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

supported case law to say that that T s got to be done.
MR. OLSON:

I guess I'm not entirely sure

what we're talking about here.
THE COURT:

Well, I T 11 let Mr. Kuhlmann

14

fill us in.

I understand your argument, Counsel,

15

it's just that I r m not very comfortable with it in

16

view of the insider nature of your accounting.

17

not sure that the agreements say that as I read it.

18

Mr. .Kuhlmann, you want to leave it where

I'm

19

it is and you think that Rule 7 has not been complied

20

with, and I'm on solid ground in ruling where I did

21

in that fashion?

22
23

Am I right, Counsel?

MR. KUHLMANN:

Your Honor, I'm at a loss

as well on Rule 7.

24

THE COURT:

You --

25

MR. KUHLMANN:

I don't recall --
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THE COURT:

You came in with your

memorandum in opposition.

Under Rule URCP 7, each

fact -- the defendants failed to dispute such factual
statements in their responsive memoranda.
URCP 7, each fact —
page.

Under

in the middle of y.our second

-Each fact set forth in the moving party's

memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.

That's what you are arguing.

MR. KUHLMANN:

Yes, Your Honor.

comfortable with standing on that.

And I am

But let me —

can

I address a couple of the facts, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

Go right ahead, Counsel.

MR. KUHLMANN:
you're right.

We didn't do an audit,

We didn't need to.

I think, why go

through the expense and incur all of that debt for my
clients after we've already lost money when we didn't
need to?
It's very -- it's a very creative argument
that's being made by Mr. Olson, but it's just plain
wrong for several reasons.

And a fact that has not

been distinguished here and may be more clear in the
Court's findings is that there is one buy-sell
agreement that makes any difference in this case.
Only one.

Not --
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1
2

THE COURT:

Because the other entity is

not existent.

3

MR. KUHLMANN:

The other entity didn't get

4

payment.

5

So we don't care.

6

They didn't cut a check to Academy Acres.

7

Acres apparently didn't exercise its right to buy out

8

the interest.

9

There was no payment made to Academy Acres.
They didn't buy out the shares.
Academy

The check was cut to Academy at Cedar

10

Mountain where there was a buy-sell agreement.

11

we're talking about $6,000.

12

to Academy Equity Investors, who does not have a

13

buy-sell agreement.

14

obligation for Sheryl Fuller's estate to pay anything

15

to them because there was no buy-sell agreement.

16

wasn't there?

17

Mr. Hughes didn't create those documents for

18

everybody to sign.

19

So

The other check was cut

Never did.

There was no

Why

Because the entities controlled by

The $115,000 simply was not due.

That was

20

paid to Academy Equity Investors.

Now, what they

21

have said is, but these are three entities but

22

they're really all the same.

23

game or you don't.

24

of the corporate and limited liability laws of the

25

State of Utah, you are bound by them.

Huh-uh, either play the

If you're going to take advantage
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separate, independent agencies.

They T re entities

that cannot simply say, Oh, we're going to pay
Academy Equity Investors but it T s really money owed
to Academy Acres pr Academy at Cedar Mountain.

So

there was no basis to pay anyway and we don f t care
what the buy-sell agreement said for Academy Acres.
THE COURT:

The whole agreement upon which

to make a claim?
MR. KUHLMANN:

Not in Academy Equiby

Investors, none, no buy-sell agreement.
The other thing I would like to point out,
Your Honor, is that there is a fairly creative
reading of this document that was created by the
entities.

Not by Ms. Farr, but by the entities.

But

if you'll look at the provision on transfers of debt,
it says the Academy -- this is the Academy at Cedar
Mountain, this is the one that T s in existence.

It

says they'll be deemed to have offered to sell to the
Academy all of its C shareholders shares in the
company at the agreed price, which is shown as
defining terms, capital letters, on the agreed terms.
Okay, again capital letters showing it as defined.
Now, if you'll look at the provision on
which they're relying for a two year mandatory
waiting period, it's simply not there.
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1

three different provisions.

One says annual

2

revisions and it says how you T re going to do it

3

annually.

4

agree -- shall review the -- again, defined term,

5

agreement price.

6

they modify that price, okay?

And it says this is

7

what you're going to look at.

So that's the annual

8

revision.

9

agreement price.

It says, Each of the stockholders shall

If they unanimously ag-ree, then

So they sit down and try and determine the

10

The second one, 2.2, says automatic

11

adjustment, and it ties to each fiscal year beginning

12

after the date of the agreement as far as it f s

13

starting point.

14

after the date of the agreement, which according to

15

the information I think was in the affidavit of Bruce

16

Hughes, said it was January 4th, I believe, of 2000

17

when Academy at Cedar Mountain signed their buy-sell

18

agreement.

19

So beginning at the fiscal year

So beginning on the fiscal year after

20

that, then if they have not unanimously agreed under

21

Section 1 of the annual revision, if they haven't

22

agreed for two consecutive years, then you appraise

23

the value as shown in Section 2.3, okay?

24

THE COURT:

With the independent CPA?

25

MR. KUHLMANN:

Exactly.

But 2.3 is not
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1

part of the two-year provision.

2

event -- how do you calculate the defined, quote,

3

agreement price?

4

whether you're doing it annually or whether you're

5

doing it automatically.

6

automatically is if the members can't agree, and it's

7

just telling you, you just do it the same way that

8

the members are doing it.

9

to do it?

10

That's 2.2.

In the

2.3 tells you how regardless of

The only time that it's done

And how are they supposed

By an independent certified accountant.
THE COURT:

So you rely on the Court's

11

reading, even if this was the agreement, but it's

12

only talking about $10,000 -- or $6,000 of over

13

$130,000?

14

MR. KUHLMANN:

Exactly, Your Honor.

I

15

mean -- and the Court's ruling is not just based on

16

this agreement.

17

accounting by the trustee, the trustee didn't act for

18

the benefit of the beneficiaries, finds that there

19

was conflict of interest, all of which, regardless of

20

this agreement, justified voiding the transactions

21

and bringing the money back into the estate and

22

charging the trustee with attorney's fees for it.

In here it finds there was no

23

So I don't think there's a problem lere.

24

THE COURT:

25

Counsel, does the court's

findings miss the difference between the entities and
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1

the fact that the check went to an -entity that did

2

not have a buy-sell?

3

MR. KUHLMANN:

I think it is a little

4

unclear because it talks about both the agreements

5

with Academy at Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres.

6

There is a comment that Academy Equity Investors was

7

in place and went out of existence in 2005, and it

8

does say that it went there.

9

this, it tended to —

10
11

But as I read through

I don ! t think Academy Acres has

any basis for anything.

They didn't get payment.

I mean, it's kind of been a mix of trying

12

to say, Well, they were all the same entities, and

13

that's kind of what the defendants 1 position has been

14

throughout the case.

15

claim whatsoever, and it --

16

THE COURT:

But I don't think they have a

Should I modify the findings

17

and the final order to reflect the distinct point

18

that you brought up at argument, Counsel?

19
20

MR. KUHLMANN:

I think it may -- may help,

Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

22

MR. KUHLMANN:

My guess this case may go

23

up on appeal, and I think it may help to make that

24

distinction.

25

THE COURT:

All

right.

That's
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1

position.

2

And, Mr. Olson, you take the position that

3

your reading is the accurate one and that this

4

tripwire simply was never tripped?

5

MR. OLSON:

Well, exactly, Your Honor.

6

And I would like to address this other entity issue

7

as well.

8

nauseam when we came in for summary judgment.

In fact, I think we argued it probably ad

9

We never disputed the fact that the

10

payment went to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, and

11

that that entity wasn't owed under the buy-sell

12

agreements.

13

for summary judgment was that it went to pay off the

14

debt at Academy Acres, LLC.

15
16
17

But the undisputed fact from our motion

THE COURT:

So it was paid in behalf of

Acres, LLC?
MR. OLSON:

I mean, the best corollary if

18

Mr. Kuhlmann owes me $10 and I owe you $10, and I say

19

Mr. Kuhlmann pay it to Judge Shumate, what's the

20

problem with doing that?

21

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

22

MR. OLSON:

They haven 1 t suggested that

23

that this isn f t exactly what happened.

24

clients conceded, Yeah, the money that went to

25

Academy Equity Investors, LLC, went to the debt of
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1

Academy Acres, LLC, no big deal.
So it ! s really of no consequence what

2
3

entity it went to, as long as the debt's satisfied.

4

THE COURT:

And as far as you look at it,

5

the real issue is whether or not that tripwire has

6

been met?

7

MR. OLSON:

Yeah.

So, you know, really

8

getting back to the tripwire issue, Mr. Kuhlmann has

9

taken us to the on account of death of a shareholder

10

or member that it's going to be paid according to the

11

agreement price, and then he takes you directly to

12

2.3, saying, Hey, it says agreement price is

13

calculated this way.

14

But if we look at Section 2, the very

15

title of that entire section is agreement price.

16

It's not just 2.3 how we calculate it, it's not just

17

the two year independent CPA rule; rather, it's the

18

annual revisions, the automatic adjustment, and then

19

if two years go by, two fiscal years go by, without

20

an agreement as to price, we get to the CPA.

21

never got there.

22

THE COURT:

We

How can there be an agreement

23

as to price when Mrs. Farr is deceased after the

24

first year and her legal representatives through her

25

trust are no longer there?

**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

16

1

MR. OLSON:

You know, and I agree that's

2

an interesting question.

At the time of her death

3

her shares are deemed offered for sale to the entity

4

at this price.
And you 1 re right under the agreement, how

5
6

do we determine what that price is?

7

members agree.

8

that entity, and the members agreed on what the price

9

was.

10

Well, the

We have four remaining members in

THE COURT:

Counsel, since your entities

11

drafted the agreement and there appears to be at

12

least some ambiguity as to how one looks at that

13

agreement under the facts of this case, Mrs. Farr

14

having died within the first two-year block, doesn't

15

the agreement get construed against you?

16

MR. OLSON:

Well, the problem, Your Honor,

17

is that Sheryl Farr, and really Mr. Kuhlmann's

18

clients are an extension of Sheryl Farr, was in on

19

the drafting.

20

THE COURT:

Uh~huh.

21

MR. OLSON:

I mean, everybody on this case

22

was a draftsman.

The heirs of Sheryl Farr may not

23

have been, but they're not parties to that agreement

24

either.

25

were Mr. Hughes, Mr. Fuller, the other Mr. Hughes,

Sheryl Farr was a party to the agreement, as
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1

and Ms. Tuttle.

2

agreements, they all entered into them, they all

3

signed them.

4

They were all the draftsmen of these

So there is not any party to construe it

5

against as, you know, Ms. Farr was a part of this as

6

well.

7

THE COURT:

I see your point.

8

MR. OLSON:

Now, the only other issue

9

that —

I mean, essentially we filed summary judgment

10

under one of the two prongs of the conflict of

11

interest statute.

12

says —

13

where the self dealing may occur.

That's when the

14

trust authorizes the transaction.

And that's the

15

argument we were making, the trust authorized payment

16

of legally enforceable claims.

17

the parties consented.

18

addressed.

19

that issue remains to be litigated.

20

The conflict of interest statute

there 1 s basically a couple of exceptions

The other one was if

That issue hasn't been

We certainly assert that they did, and

So I think the Court needs to understand

21

that before we start issuing summary judgment on the

22

entire case.

23

believe that there is certainly evidence that will

24

suggest at the very least Chad Farr consented to

25

this, knew full well what was going on.

That issue hasn't been addressed.
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The other issues that I think the Court
needs to address if the Court is going to deny my
motion today, and I can't think of any reason why
they would.

But if the Court is going to deny my

motion today, where I'm a little curious in the
Court's order it says the buy-sell agreements must be
followed and remain from litigation, and I'm a little
unclear as to what the Court was intending there.
Are we not, then, going back and saying, okay, we
need to find out whether the calculation was the
right calculation?
THE COURT:

That's the way I saw it,

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

Counsel.
And so I guess under

that theory, if we continued in litigation under the
Court's order as set, we come into the court, we put
on the evidence of whether that figure was the right
figure.

If it .was the right figure, there is no

money to be paid back.

If it was the wrong figure,

then there's money to be paid back.
THE COURT:

And the issue is what do we do

with the money in the meantime?

And the Court's

order says to pay it back into the trust and to hold
it until the trust until that litigation is done, we
figure out what the price is.
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MR. OLSON:

Right.

THE COURT:

That T s the way I see the

litigation coming out.

I don't see this case having

been dissolved -- or resolved by my summary judgment.
MR. OLSON:

And, of course --

THE COURT:

In fact, I have to say since

she's here in the courtroom, my clerk and I both came
to that conclusion at the time we were going over
this order specifically, we decided that the next
step is to find out what is the price.
MR. OLSON:

Okay.

And then the only issue

with regard to disgorgement, obviously, is, I mean,
this payment was made back in ! 03.
THE COURT:

That's not an issue for the

Court, Counsel.
MR. OLSON:

And I understand, and where

does the money come from, is the question?

Academy

Equity Investors doesn't have it, it was paid to
creditors.

I mean, we can't go back to creditors and

find it.
THE COURT:

Academy Equity Investors

better find a line of credit.
MR. OLSON:

Well, and I understand where

Your Honor is coming from.
I guess the last point I would ask, Your
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1

Honor, if the order is going to stand despite the

2

motion being filed, would the Court entertain

3

certifying it as a final order?

4

THE COURT:

I can't, Counsel, not when my

5

order itself says that we have to litigate the issue

6

of whether or not the buy-sell agreements have been

7

appropriately met.

8

and an expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in

9

and looks at what your clients did and said, yeah,

It may be moot if you 1 re right

10

that f s the way you value it and they were right, then

11

we f re done.

12
13
14

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

Fair enough, Your

THE COURT:

It's, again, the place that my

Honor.

15

clerk and I got to was exactly where you're talking

16

about, Counsel --

17

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

18

THE COURT:

—

19

MR. OLSON:

Thank you.

20

THE COURT:

Thanks, everyone.

21
22

as we looked at it.

The motion

is overruled and denied.
And, Counsel, in view of the fact that the

23

court summary judgment has rather now narrowed our

24

scope of our litigation, I think we probably ought to

25

get a scheduling order for that evaluation and

**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING,
(435)
688-7844

INC.**

21

litigation.

Can the two of you sit down give me a

scheduling order within the next 20 days?
MR. OLSON:

I would take it that the

discovery deadlines are being extended?
THE COURT:

The discovery deadlines have

to be extended so you can get out and get some expert
testimony on this.
MR. OLSON:

Yeah, we can extend our order.

THE COURT:

You may want to get your own

independent expert who's going to say exactly what
your people said.
MR. OLSON:

Correct.

THE COURT:

Mr. Kuhlmann might find that

he can't find one, in which case this case is over
with.
MR. OLSON

Okay.

THE COURT

Thanks, everyone.

MR. OLSON

Thank you, Your Honor,
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